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Journal of Finance's Blog

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The Macroeconomics of Shadow Banking

June 22, 2017 Comments (0)

ABSTRACT
We build a macro‐finance model of shadow banking—the transformation of risky assets into securities that are money‐like in quiet times but become illiquid when uncertainty spikes. Shadow banking economizes on scarce collateral, expanding liquidity provision, boosting asset prices and growth, but also building up fragility. A rise in uncertainty raises shadow banking spreads, forcing financial institutions to switch to collateral‐intensive funding. Shadow banking collapses, liquidity...

Matching Capital and Labor

June 22, 2017 Comments (0)

ABSTRACT
We establish an important role for the firm by studying capital reallocation decisions of mutual fund firms. The firm's decision to reallocate capital amongst its mutual fund managers adds at least $474,000 a month, which amounts to over 30% of the total value added of the industry. We provide evidence that this additional value added results from the firm's private information about the skill of its managers. The firm captures this value because investors reward the firm following a...

A Model of Monetary Policy and Risk Premia

June 22, 2017 Comments (0)

ABSTRACT
We develop a dynamic asset pricing model in which monetary policy affects the risk premium component of the cost of capital. Risk‐tolerant agents (banks) borrow from risk‐averse agents (i.e., take deposits) to fund levered investments. Leverage exposes banks to funding risk, which they insure by holding liquidity buffers. By changing the nominal rate the central bank influences the liquidity premium, and hence the cost of taking leverage. Lower nominal rates make liquidity cheaper and...

Are CDS Auctions Biased and Inefficient?

June 21, 2017 Comments (0)

ABSTRACT
We study the design of CDS auctions, which determine the payments by CDS sellers to CDS buyers following defaults of bonds. Using a simple model, we find that the current design of CDS auctions leads to biased prices and inefficient allocations. This is because various restrictions imposed in CDS auctions prevent certain investors from participating in the price discovery and allocation process. The imposition of a price cap or floor also gives dealers large influence on the final...

MISCELLANEA

June 2, 2017 Comments (0)


Firm Investment and Stakeholder Choices: A Top‐Down Theory of Capital Budgeting

June 1, 2017 Comments (0)

ABSTRACT
This paper develops a top‐down model of capital budgeting in which privately informed executives make investment choices that convey information to the firm's stakeholders (e.g., employees). Favorable information in this setting encourages stakeholders to take actions that positively contribute to the firm's success (e.g., employees work harder). Within this framework we examine how firms may distort their investment choices to influence the information conveyed to stakeholders and...